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Synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation of the type in the rubber hand illusion (RHI)1-3 and in out 
of body experience (OBE) 4, 5 can induce the brain to incorporate external objects or images into 
a part or whole of body image. Whether in the context of RHI or OBE, since the participant 
passively receives visuo-tactile stimulations, body image appears only with the sense of 
ownership (SoO), not with the sense of agency (the registration that we are the initiators of our 
actions; SoA) 6,7. Insofar as self-consciousness as a body image is a unity acting in its 
environments, body image has to be investigated in the relationship between SoO and SoA8,9. It 
requires an experimental condition in which SoO and SoA can be independently separated in an 
active condition. However, no experimental condition that is opposite to RHI and OBE in which 
a subject can feel SoA but not SoO has been proposed to date10. Here, we show that a person 
loses SoO for his own hand that he can freely move by his own will when he sees himself in a 
lateral view through a head mounted display. It was previously thought that SoO can be 
represented by synchronous inter-modal stimulations10, and that SoO appears to be 
complemented by SoA11. Our findings show that SoO can be lost under a synchronous 
visuo-proprioceptive condition while SoA can be maintained. SoO and SoA are two aspects of 
body representation, and similar dissociations have been proposed in various contexts, such as 
body image and body schema12,13, and ‘Acting I’ and ‘Mine’14. Our result suggests that the 
two-centric-self consisting of SoA and SoO can enhance dynamically robust self-consciousness. 
 
 Under a passive condition revealing RHI and OBE, only SoO is explicitly acquired by 
a person. By contrast, in an active condition such as the phantom limb experiment15,16, 
pantomime task17, and synchronous virtual hand task7, SoA is explicitly acquired by the person 
and SoO seems to accompany SoA. These experiments are conducted so that the person 
incorporates external objects into body image. Thus, it is difficult to see the loss of SoO. We 
therefore conducted an experiment in which a person can lose SoO for his own hand. 
 
(Figure 1) 
 
Participants (n= 28) were seated while wearing a head mounted display (HMD) onto 
which was projected real-time motion images of one side of their own upper body filmed by 
two video cameras placed side by side. The video cameras were placed 130 cm away from the 
participant, with a 10-cm distance between the two video cameras. The images from the left 
video camera were presented via the left eye display and that from the right camera via the right 
display. The participant could see his or her own lateral view stereoscopically. The participant 
was shown four kinds of counterbalanced images for 30 seconds: the right or left side of his 
body and in an invisible or visible condition. In the invisible condition, the participant could not 
see his upper arm since he was instructed to hide it behind his own body. In the visible condition, 
he was instructed to keep it on view in front of his body, thereby serving as a control experiment 
(Figure 1). During each trial, the participant could move his arm behind his body freely under 
the invisible or visible condition, and he was requested to orally provide an open-ended 
description of his experiences. All participants reported that they could move their own hands 
freely as they intended to move them, regardless of the visible and invisible conditions. Such a 
finding reveals they had SoA. 
 
(Figure 2) 
 
After 30 seconds viewing each motion image, participants were asked to complete a 
questionnaire in which they had to affirm or deny the occurrence of seven specific perceptual 
effects using a seven-point visual analog scale. The completed questionnaire indicated that 
participants experienced strong loss of SoO under the invisible condition (Fig. 2) and the side of 
subject’s body did not influence (maximum F(1,108)=2.30 then P=0.13). The first three 
questionnaire items were important to estimate the loss of SoO, and the results for items 1 and 2 
showed significant differences between the visible and invisible conditions (item 1: P <0.001, t 
=4.91, item 2: P <0.001, t =4.60). The particularly highly positive score for item 1 indicates that 
the participant felt as if the hand were not his own despite moving it by his own will. While 
there was a significant difference between two conditions in the scores for items 2 and 3, the 
scores were not high. The questionnaire items making the person indicate the owner of the hand 
(which also included nobody in item 3: P =0.06, t =1.91) might serve as the justice of 
ownership9, different from the feeling of ownership relevant to item 1. Results for items 4 and 5 
showed that the hand was not recognized as anything but a hand and to be controllable, thereby 
confirming SoA. This result held irrespective of the invisible or visible condition (item 4: P 
=0.46, t =0.74, item 5: P =0.27, t =1.12). Items 6 and 7 were also relevant to SoA. Although 
participants denied the occurrence of the perceptual effect for these items, there was a 
significant difference between the visible and invisible conditions (item 6: P < 0.003, t = 3.12, 
item 7: P < 0.02, t = 2.45). A significant difference between the conditions reveals that the 
feeling that SoA is weakly lost.  
 
(Figure 3) 
 
We hypothesized that the loss of SoO is caused by the participant’s false recognition 
that the visual configuration of the hand and the body is congruent to the proprioception. The 
elbow and upper arm can be clearly seen by the participant in the visible condition, making it is 
easy for him to imagine that the hand is connected by the shoulder. This was tested in a second 
experiment by measuring the difference between the actual and the participant’s estimated angle 
made by the upper arm and the body (Fig. 3a, also see SI). The difference of the angle in the 
invisible condition was larger than that in the visible condition (P=0.003, t=3.11) (Fig. 3b), 
indicating that the participants overestimated the angle and lost the correct positional awareness of 
body parts under the invisible condition. We also conducted a third experiment to estimate 
whether participants felt or not as if the hand appearing in front of the body could be the 
experimenter’s arm or a steel arm. Participants were asked to complete the same questionnaire 
as used in experiment 1. Although the scores of affirmation of the feeling that the hand was 
owned by another were not high, there was also a significant difference between the visible and 
invisible conditions (see SI). 
The present illusion is fundamentally important because it provides the first 
experimental condition of SoA without SoO. In the passive condition, RHI and OBE reveal that 
multi-sensory synchronous interaction (Sense of being acted upon; So-be-A) can produce SoO1-5. 
Conversely, it is reported that SoO can produce the sense of being acted upon18. Thus, under the 
passive condition, SoO is equivalent to So-be-A. Since SoO and SoA are relevant to the 
distinction between you and me in terms of neuroactivity7, investigation of the dynamical 
relation of SoO and SoA is necessary. The feeling of SoO or SoA alone has been noted in 
deafferented19 and/or schizophrenia patients20, and our findings relating to healthy persons’ 
self-consciousness can contribute to expanding the knowledge about these patients. 
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Figure 1. Experimental images viewed by the participant. They viewed these motion images 
during each trial on a the head mounted display. a: the invisible condition; b: the visible 
condition. 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Questionnaire results, presenting means and standard errors of each item for the two 
experimental (invisible and visible) conditions. The single or double asterisk indicates significant 
differences (P=0.05 or P=0.01 respectively). 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3 a. Difference of the angle (Δθ) between the actual angle made by the upper arm and the 
body (θ0) and the estimated angle (θ). Participants were exposed to the condition of our first 
experiment for a prolonged period, and were asked to estimate the angle between the body and the 
upper arm at the hidden side in the anterior view (also see SI). b. The angle difference under the 
invisible (I) and visible (V) conditions. 
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